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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

FIFTH CIRCUIT PRESERVES
RIGHTS OF LEASEHOLD
MORTGAGEE AS THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY OF A “ DEEMED
REJECTED” LEASE

The Bankruptcy Code gives the
trustee or debtor in possession the
power, subject to court approval, to
assume or reject executory con
tracts and unexpired leases.' The
rationale underlying the power to
reject is that the trustee or debtor in
possession should be insulated from
the need to perform contractual ob
ligations that impose burdensome
liabilities upon the bankruptcy es
tate. By rejecting such contracts,
damage claims by nondebtor parties
are treated in the bankruptcy case
as prepetition claims.**
For the protection of nondebtor
parties, the Bankruptcy Code con
tains certain time limitations for the
trustee to assume or reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases. For
’ Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
" Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra Uni
versity School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.;
member of the National Bankruptcy Confer
ence.
' 11 U .S.C.§ 365(a).
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).

example, if a nonresidential real es
tate lease under which the debtor is
the tenant is neither assumed nor
rejected within sixty days after the
filing of a voluntary baidcruptcy pe
tition, the lease is “ deemed reject
ed” and “ the trustee shall immedi
ately surrender such nonresidential
real property to the lessor. ’
A question that is not answered
directly by the Bankruptcy Code is
whether a “ deemed rejected” lease
continues to be an enforceable
agreement with respect to the rights
of third-party beneficiaries against
nondebtor parties. Is a rejected lease
one that is considered “ terminated’’
so that all rights of all parties are
extinguished? Or is the rejection
nothing more than a breach by the
debtor that leaves the lease intact
with respect to the rights and obliga
tions of others? In a recent case.
In re Austin Development Co. ,* the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir
cuit explored this issue and held that
rejection of a lease by the trustee or
debtor in possession did not extin
guish the rights of third party benefi
ciaries.
ä IIU .S .C . § 365(d)(4). The court may,
within the sixty-day period and for cause,
extend this time period. In an involuntary
case, the sixty-day period runs firom the
order for relief.
* 19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 1994).
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The Facts
Austin Development Co., a les
see under a long-term ground lease,
built a motion picture theater on
the leased premises financed with
borrowed funds. Sowashee Ven
ture, a general partnership, is the
ground lessor. R&S Theaters, Inc.
is the sublessee of the premises and
is the current operator of the theater.
In 1985, Austin borrowed money
from Eastover Bank for Savings and
used a portion of the funds to pay
off the original lender. As security
for the loan, Austin gave Eastover a
deed of trust on its tenant-leasehold
interest in the ground lease and, in
addition, gave Eastover an assign
ment of Austin’s interest in the sub
lease to R&S.
Typically, R&S, as subtenant,
paid approximately $11,000 in
monthly rental and taxes directly to
Eastover, who then applied about
$9,000 to Austin’s debt, paid So
washee $1,500 as monthly rent un
der the ground lease, and held in
escrow money for ad valorem taxes.
An important provision in the
ground lease, designated as para
graph 21, became the central focus
of the Austin Development case.
This lengthy paragraph granted
Austin permission to mortgage all
or part of its leasehold estate and
granted any future leasehold mort
gagee numerous rights as a thirdparty beneficiary of the ground
lease. Similar to the provisions
found in nondisturbance agree
ments between landlords and lease
hold mortgagees, the rights granted

by paragraph 21 included (1) a re
quirement that the parties to the
ground lease obtain the leasehold
mortgagee’s written consent before
any cancellation, surrender, or
modification ofithe ground lease;
(2) the right of the leasehold mort
gagee to cure the lessee’s defaults;
(3) the right of the leasehold mort
gagee to nullify any termination de
clared by the ground lessor, or to
indefinitely postpone such termina
tion, by curing all conditions of de
fault; and (4) in the event that the
lease is terminated, the right of the
leasehold mortgagee to enter into a
new lease with the landlord on the
same terms as the terminated lease.
Austin’s Bankruptcy and
Rejection of the Ground Lease
Austin filed a Chapter 11 petition
on January 2, 1991, and failed to
either assume or reject the ground
lease within sixty days after that
date. Eastover did not file any mo
tion seeking to compel Austin, as
debtor in possession, to assume the
ground lease. Therefore, according
to Section 365(d)(4) of the Code,
the ground lease was deemed reject
ed and the debtor in possession was
required to immediately surrender
the premises. Sowashee, as ground
lessor, then asked the court to termi
nate Austin’s interest as lessee un
der the ground lease, to terminate
Eastover’s deed of trust on Austin’s
leasehold interest, and to terminate
Eastover’s interest in the sublease
with R&S. On the basis of para
graph 21 of the ground lease, Eas-
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tover filed a counterclaim re
questing an order compelling
Sowashee to enter into a new ground
lease with Eastover as ground
lessee.
Because R&S, as operator of the
theater, obtained a separate nondis
turbance agreement with Sowashee,
its leasehold rights remained in
place despite Austin’s bankruptcy
and rejection of the ground lease.
Therefore, the effect of rejection of
the ground lease on the theater’s
rights to remain in possession of the
premises was not considered.
The bankruptcy court and the dis
trict court both held in favor of
Sowashee and against Eastover in
all respects, ruling that rejection of
the ground lease under Section
365(d)(4) resulted in a termination
of Eastover’s third-party beneficia
ry rights under the ground lease, as
well as its rights in the sublease
payments. In essence, the lower
courts viewed rejection of the
ground lease as the termination of
all rights thereunder. According to
these courts, Eastover lost its secu
rity for its loan, and Sowashee was
free to treat R&S as its tenant in
accordance with the nondisturbance
agreement—free and clear of any
rights of Eastover.
The Court of Appeals Reverses
The court of appeals began its
analysis by stating the issue: “ The
question presented in this case is
what it means when a debtor as a
lessee of nonresidential real proper
ty fails within 60 days after filing
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a Chapter 11 case to assume an
unexpired lease. Under section
365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the lease is ‘deemed rejected. ’ Does
the rejection terminate the lease and
thus extinguish a security interest
taken in the debtor’s interest in the
lease, a sublease by the debtor-les
see, or similar rights that accrued
by and among third parties?’’’
The court commented that, al
though this issue arises infrequent
ly, the decisions of the bankruptcy
courts that have considered it are
“ starkly conflicting.’’* One line of
cases that was followed by the bank
ruptcy and district courts in Austin
Development construes Section
365(d)(4) as an avoiding power
against holders of security interests
in the leasehold interest of the debt
or-tenant who rejects the lease.’
This line of cases reasons that the
language of the Code that states that
the debtor must “ immediately sur
render the premises” upon a
‘‘deemed” rejection effects a termi
nation of the lease. “ Under these
cases, the lease is terminated by
operation of federal law and not
because of any breach of its terms’’
and, upon such termination, “ secu
rity interests in the lease are extin
guished.” *
The court of appeals did not find
persuasive this line of cases that
’ 19F.3datl080.
‘ 19F.3datl080.
’ The court of appeals cited, e.g.. In re
Giles Assocs., Ltd., 92 B.R. 695 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex 1988); In re Hawaii Dimensions,
Inc., 39 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984),
a ff’d. 47 B.R. 425 (D. Haw. 1985).
* 19F.3datl081.
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treated “ deemed rejected” leases,
as well as third-party rights thereun
der, as terminated. “ Flawed by
their failure to analyze section
365(d)(4) in harmony with the rest
of section 365 and applicable statu
tory antecedents, these opinions
have worked needless and perhaps
unconstitutional forfeitures of secu
rity interests. ’” The court referred
to Section 70(b) of the former Bank
ruptcy Act, from which Section 365
derives, and noted that the Fifth
Circuit held in 1978 that “ the
deemed rejection of a lease under
section 70(b) did not terminate the
lease but merely placed the trustee’s
obligation to perform under the
leasehold outside of the bankruptcy
ad m in istra tio n without destroying
the leasehold estate.” '® The court
was of the view that the reasoning
of its 1978 decision remains persua
sive under the Code because Sec
tions 70(b) and 365(d)(4) do not
materially differ in the way they
effectuate the assumption and rejec
tion power.
The court then focused on the
language of Section 365, noting that
the terms “ rejection,” “ breach,”
and “ termination” are used differ
ently rather than interchangeably.
“ Throughout section 365, rejection
refers to the debtor’s decision not
’ 19F.3datl081.
19 F.3d at 1081. The court was refer
ring to its decision in In re Garfmkle, 577
F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978), where the court
held that the mortgage of the original lessee
from whom the debtor acquired the leasehold
was preserved notwithstanding an attempted
rejection.

to assume a burdensome lease or
executory contract. Section 365(g)
states that rejection of a lease ‘con
stitutes a breach’. . . . Three cir
cuits, including this one, have held
that this language does not mean
that the executory contract or lease
has been terminated, but only that a
breach has been deemed to oc
cur.” " The court also pointed out
that Section 502(g) permits the nondebtor party to a rejected contract
or lease to assert a claim for dam
ages as of the date of bankruptcy.
‘‘Ulf rejection were deemed a com
plete, immediate termination, it is
not clear what the measure of the
creditor’s claim would be.
In addition, the court noted that
Congress knew how to provide for
termination, as opposed to rejec
tion, of an executory contract or
unexpired lease when it wanted to.
“ Termination” is the term used in
Sections 365(h), 365(i), and 365(n)
as an option that may be available
to a timeshare purchaser, a vendee
of real property, or a licensee of
intellectual property, but only if the
trustee has rejected the executory
contract. “ Accordingly, the trustee
may reject any of these contracts.
" 19 F.3d at 1082. The three circuit
court decisions cited by the court are In re
Continental Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1459
(5th Cir. 1993) (“ [T]o assert that a contract
effectively does not exist as of the date of
rejection is inconsistent with deeming the
same contract breached.” ); In re Modem
Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th
Cir. 1990); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First
Tennessee Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 86 F.2d 434,
436-437 (6th Cir. 1987).
19 F.3d at 1082.
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but termination does not occur ex
cept at the other party’s option. . . .
Under an objective reading, the pro
visions of section 365 may be redun
dant and complex, but Congress
was not confused in its differing
usages of the terms rejection,
breach and termination. ’’
Moreover, the court of appeals
pointed out that breach and termina
tion of a contract are not synony
mous terms under state law. “ Con
gress could have chosen to depart
from the state law meanings of these
terms, but taken as a whole, section
365 suggests that it did not do so. ”
But if rejection alone is not the
equivalent of a termination of an
executory contract, what about a
“ deemed rejection” coupled with
the “ immediate surrender” of the
premises under Section 365(d)(4)?
This was still not enough to consti
tute termination of the lease, ac
cording to the court of appeals. Al
though the court recognized that
there are decisions holding that re
jection-coupled with the require
ment under Section 365(d)(4) that
the debtor surrender the premises—
must be seen as a termination of the
trustee’s rights under the lease, the
court of appeals criticized that line
of reasoning as ultimately resting
on a “ manufactured definition of
termination as ‘breach plus surren
der of the premises.’
In support
of its conclusion, the court in Austin
Development noted that the word
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“ termination” does not appear in
Section 365(d)(4). It also pointed
out that “ deemed rejected” under
Section 365(d)(1) does not result in
termination. It is also interesting to
see that Section 365(d)(5) provides
for termination of an air carrier’s
lease of an aircraft terminal or gate
before a “ deemed rejection.” That
is, under Section 365(d)(5), the air
craft terminal or gate lease is
‘‘deemed rejected’’ five days afier
the occurrence of a “ termination
event.” In sum, “ [sjection 365 of
fers no textual support for equating
‘breach plus surrender’ with ‘termi
nation;’ to the contrary, it furnishes
good reasons for deducing that Con
gress did not collapse breach or re
jection into the termination of a
lease or executory contract.’”®
No Policy Reason to Treat Lease as
Terminated
The court’s conclusion that Aus
tin’s ground lease was not automati
cally terminated when it was
deemed rejected pursuant to Section
365(d)(4) left intact the rights af
forded to Eastover Bank as a lease
hold mortgagee and third-party ben
eficiary of the lease. As further
support for that conclusion, the
court commented that any contrary
result that deprives Eastover of its
rights under die lease would be “ a
capricious result that makes no
bankruptcy sense.” *’ The most ad
verse consequence of treating the
lease as terminated would be the

" Id. at 1082-1083.
“ Id. at 1083.
>5 Id. at 1083.

'« Id. at 1083.
" Id. at 1083.
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forfeiture by operation of law of
Eastover’s mortgagee rights rather
than any loss to tiie lessor or lessee.
“ This result has no policy rationale
within the scope of section 365’s
adjustment of rights between the
parties to the lease,’” * the court
commented.
If Section 365(d)(4) would have
the effect of terminating Eastover’s
security interest in Austin’s lease
hold interest, this section would,
according to the court of appeals,
constitute an avoiding power—simi
lar to the trustee’s power to avoid
certain liens as preferences or un
perfected security interests. How
ever, when the Code grants the
trustee an avoiding power, that
power is expressly authorized and
requires commencement of an ad
versary proceeding with its atten
dant procedural protections. In con
trast, any avoiding power under
Section 365(d)(4) would be “ un
characteristically, an implied au
thority’”’ triggered by operation of
law without any procedural protec
tions. In addition, such an avoiding
power—if it would exist under Sec
tion 365(d)(4)—would not benefit
the bankruptcy estate. The court
said that
“ [T|n eliminating the rights of a mort
gagee of the debtor-lessee’s interest
in a lease, the policies justifying
avoidance—to enhance the pot of un
encumbered assets available to credi
tors and to discourage a race to the
courthouse before bankruptcy—have

not been served. The only rights af
fected by this implied avoidance
power are outside of the bankruptcy
court’s realm because after rejection,
the debtor’s estate is no longer in
volved in the leasehold transaction.
This extraordinary implied power
does not reduce claims against the
debtor’s estate; if anything, it in
creases the unsecured claims by the
amount of the mortgagee’s claim in
the ‘terminated’ lease.
For these reasons, we conclude
that a debtor’s-inaction in timely de
ciding to assume or reject a lease
of nonresidential real property under
section 365(d)(4), which leads to a
deemed rejection, does not effect a
termination of that lease, or, conse
quently, an implied forfeiture of the
rights of third parties to the lease. ’
Applying this legal analysis to the
facts, the court of appeals concluded
that when Austin failed to timely
assume or reject the ground lease,
Sowashee became entitled to file a
proof of claim for damages based
on Austin’s breach, which, pursuant
to Sections 365(g) and 502(g), was
effective immediately before bank
ruptcy. Under Section 365(d)(3),
Sowashee also was entitled to re
ceive rent from the filing of the
petition to the date of the lease rejec
tion. However, since the lease was
not terminated upon rejection, Eastover—as third-party beneficiary of
paragraph 21 of the lease between
Austin and Sowashee—retained its
rights against Sowashee. Finally,
the court held that “ [t]he extent

'• Id. at 1083.
” Id. at 1083.

“ Id. at 1083.
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of Eastover’s rights, an issue not
adjudicated below, should be decid
ed in state court, because after rejec
tion the debtor’s estate had no re
maining interest in the outcome of
that controversy, which is not ‘relat
ed to’ the bankruptcy as is required
for federal jurisdiction. ’
Conclusion
The reasoning of the court of ap
peals in Austin Development is con
sistent with recent case law^^ and
scholarly articles“ focusing on the
effect of rejection of an executory
contract. A prevailing theme that
has become apparent in recent years
is that rejection is not the same as
rescission or termination of an
agreement, but is merely the trust
ai Id. at 1084. The court cited 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b), which governs federal bankrupt
cy jurisdiction.
“ See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lam
bert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejection of employment
agreement by debtor employer had no effect
on employee’s property r i^ ts in escrowed
bond fund acquired prepetition by the em
ployee under the employment agreement).
“ See Westbrook, “ A Functional Analy
sis of Executory Contracts,” 74 Minn. L.
Rev. 227 (1989); Andrew, “ Executory Con
tracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding Rejec
tion,” 59Univ. of Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1988).
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ee’s decision not to assume it. That
is, rejection is treated as nothing
more than a prepetition breach giv
ing rise to a damage claim against
the estate. In all other respects the
agreement remains effective. For
example, if prior to bankruptcy, a
property interest had passed from
the debtor to the nondebtor party
in accordance with the executory
contract, rejection does not result in
the reversion or termination of that
property interest.“
"The rejected lease should contin
ue to govern the rights of a nondebt
or third-party beneficiary as against
a nondebtor party. As the court indi
cates, there is no good policy reason
for not protecting Eastover’s rights
against Sowashee. It is interesting to
note that if Eastover and Sowashee
signed a separate agreement provid
ing for the same rights as is con
tained in paragraph 21 of the lease,
the effect of the debtor’s rejection
of the ground lease on Eastover’s
contractual right against Sowashee
to enter into a new ground lease
would never have been an issue.
“ See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lam
bert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).

312

